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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs made a choice. By electing franchisee status and the compensation 
package that went with it, the named Plaintiffs increased their annual income by more 
than $50,000 each. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to have their 
welfare benefits subsidized by the company. This claim must be rejected because 
Plaintiffs did not actually earn those benefits before the FPA terminated, because the 
BFA expressly removed their claim to such benefits, and because they were told, 
explicitly and repeatedly, that they would no longer receive those subsidies if they chose 
the new franchise relationship. Plaintiffs' answering brief does not justify the result they 
seek. 
First, Plaintiffs fail to identify the source of their contract claim in the FPA. While 
Plaintiffs contend that the FPA contained a "promise" of contributions for reaching Star 
Quest, they do not identify a single provision in the contract making such a "promise." 
The document on which they rely says only that, upon reaching a Star Level, the planners 
became "eligible" to earn benefits payments in the following year. This did not create a 
vested benefit. In fact, Section III of the FPA expressly stated that benefits not earned 
prior to its termination would not survive. Summary judgment should have been granted 
to AEFA for failure to identify an explicit, unconditional promise of benefits after 
termination. 
Second, judgment should have been entered for AEFA as a matter of law because 
the unambiguous language of the BFA eliminated Plaintiffs' claim. The BFA plainly 
states that its compensation package is the "complete" amount due for Plaintiffs' 
"relationship with AEFA," and declares that the BFA supersedes "all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements." Plaintiffs seek to exploit an exception in the BFA for 
benefits plans that are amended to "specifically refer to Independent Advisors in their 
role as Independent Advisors." However, Plaintiffs then ignore this very elaborate 
language and rely on Star Quest documents that do not use that phrase at all. The BFA is 
a substitute contract that restructured the parties' relationship and provided a new 
compensation scheme in place of the old. 
At the very least, AEFA's very reasonable interpretation of the BFA should have 
prevented summary judgment for Plaintiffs. At the trial level, AEFA expressly opposed 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, disputing their facts and offering conflicting 
evidence. For example, when Plaintiffs argued that their purpose was not to enter into a 
substitute contract, AEFA presented conflicting testimony from the named Plaintiffs 
themselves. But even more important, AEFA argued that it is the objectively manifested 
intent of the parties that controls. Here, AEFA had distributed multiple bulletins making 
clear that benefits contributions would not be available under the BFA. Plaintiffs do not 
dispute the adequacy of these notices. At a minimum, AEFA should have had an 
opportunity to present this extensive evidence to a jury. 
Finally, Plaintiffs fail to justify the exclusion at trial of $9 million in offsetting 
benefits. Plaintiffs claim that offsets are required "only" if the damaged party is relieved 
of performance, but they cite no legal authority to support this proposition. They do not 
attempt to address the cases offered by AEFA, which apply the larger principle that the 
defendant is entitled to an offset whenever he can prove that the plaintiff received a 
benefit proximately caused by the breach. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED THE "PROMISE" ON WHICH 
THEIR CLAIM RESTS AND FAIL TO SATISFY FPA SECTION III 
Plaintiffs' argument rests on an unsupported assumption. Plaintiffs assume that 
they are "entitled" to benefits contributions because AEFA "promised" its planners that 
"they would receive an enumerated benefit contribution if they met specified production 
goals." PL Br. 2, 7; see also id. at 10, 34. However, Plaintiffs' brief fails to substantiate 
this "entitlement." Plaintiffs never identify a single provision in the FPA that made a 
"promise" of this kind—an unconditional guarantee of benefits contributions to planners 
who met those goals. There is good reason why. 
The FPA provided only that Planners who met Star Quest's production levels 
would be eligible for, not entitled to, contributions from AEFA. In fact, in the sole 
passage where Plaintiffs describe the Star Quest program, they quote this sentence as the 
source of their claim: 
To remain eligible for a company contribution to group 
benefits, advisors must meet the minimum weighted 
production requirement in any given year. 
PL Br. 3 (quoting R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 8, at AX001623 n.** [AD 24] (emphasis added)). 
On its face, this language did not supply a promise of benefits, but a statement of 
eligibility. The FPA's benefits handbook likewise explained unequivocally that meeting 
Star Quest's production levels made a planner "eligible to receive a Company 
contribution toward the cost of... insurance coverage." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6, at 
AX001233 (emphasis added). Even though AEFA's opening brief (AEFA Br. 21-26) 
pointed out that Plaintiffs could not assume they had "earned" benefits contributions 
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when the contract simply declared them "eligible" for payments in the following year, 
Plaintiffs never even address—let alone refute—this crucial distinction. The distinction 
between eligibility and entitlement is important because a planner who had become 
eligible for Star Quest still had to earn the contributions by continuing to work under the 
FPA in the second year, as well as elect the applicable benefits plan. See AEFA Br. 8-9, 
24-25. There was no promise that the planner became entitled simply by reaching a 
sales target. 
Based on their unsubstantiated assumption of a promise, Plaintiffs then contend 
that AEFA unlawfully "revoke[d]" its offer under Star Quest "after the plaintiffs had 
undertaken to perform." PL Br. 11. But AEFA did not revoke its offer under Star Quest. 
AEFA promised the same thing under Star Quest in 1999 as it did in 1997 and 1998: that 
planners who met the year's specified minimum TWP would be "eligible" to receive 
benefits payments by meeting the FPA's various requirements and conditions in the 
following year. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 8, at AX001623 n.** [AD 24]; see also R. 1450, Dep. 
Ex. 6, at AX001233. The terms of that offer did not change. Instead, the entire contract 
terminated in accordance with its provisions. Those provisions specifically allowed the 
1
 This requirement that planners earn their contributions through their work in the next 
year is borne out by the parties' consistent practice under the FPA. Plaintiffs testified that the 
company never made benefits payments once a planner left the company. See AEFA Br. 8-9. In 
fact, Plaintiffs admitted on summary judgment that "all benefits contributions" under the FPA 
ceased once a planner's "FPA contract was terminated." Compare R. 306-07, with R. 1452, at 
11. 
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FPA to terminate "without cause with 15 days' written notice." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 17, at 
AX001980[AD22]. 
In this respect, Plaintiffs' claim resembles those of distance runners who are told 
that, with a good time in one event (e.g., the Boston Marathon), they will be 
automatically eligible to compete in that event in the following year. If the event is not 
held the next year, the runner has no claim against the organizers. By the same token, the 
planners here, though eligible to earn Star Quest benefits under the FPA in the following 
year, had no claim when that contract terminated pursuant to its terms. 
In fact, the contract here did not just provide for termination, it gave express 
warning that there would be no additional compensation after the contract ended. The 
FPA specifically voided all compensation that had not vested upon the contract's 
termination. Section III of the FPA stated: 
When this agreement terminates, you will not, except as 
provided by the Sales Compensation Plan, be entitled to . . . 
any further commissions, fees, overwriting or other 
compensation. 
Id.; see also FPA § VI, id., at AX001977 [A19]. By these terms, a planner's claims to 
compensation not yet earned plainly expired when the FPA did. Because the benefits in 
dispute here had not been earned when the FPA ended on March 21, 2000, Plaintiffs have 
no claim to them. 
The proviso of Section III, stating "except as provided in the Sales Compensation 
Plan," does not help the planners. Plaintiffs have not been able to point to any language 
in the Sales Compensation Plan preserving their claim for Star Quest benefits after the 
- 5 -
FPA's termination. The broad language of Section III expressly makes this their burden, 
and Plaintiffs' failure to carry that burden dooms their contract claim.2 
Moreover, as explained in AEFA's opening bnef (AEFA Br. 21-23), Minnesota 
law (like ERISA) requires a contract to contain "specific vesting language" for benefits to 
continue after its termination. Hughes v. 3M Retiree Med. Plan, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 
1071 (D. Minn. 2001), affd, 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Chiles v. 
Cendian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1996); AEFA Br. 21-23 & n.6. Plaintiffs 
now attempt to circumvent this line of cases with the cursory statement that "[n]one of 
the plaintiffs were terminated." PL Br. 15. This is immaterial. None of the cases cited 
by AEFA turned on whether the party seeking continued compensation remained 
affiliated with the company. They all focused on the contractual issue of whether the 
benefits being sought were supported by the written terms of their agreements. Hughes, 
" Plaintiffs' position is made even more difficult by Section 9 of the Benefits Handbook, 
which stated that AEFA "makes no promise to continue these benefits in the future" and that 
"Mights to future benefits will never vest." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 6, at AX001386 [AD 102] While 
Plaintiffs accuse (PI. Br. 15) AEFA of "knowing misrepresentation" for relying on this language, 
it is Plaintiffs who fail to quote completely. The sentence on which they rely states: "Except for 
the claims review procedure, this section applies only to first year financial advisors, district 
managers within the State of New York, field vice presidents and group vice presidents " Id at 
AX001379 [AD 95] (emphasis added). Thus, Section 9, entitled "Claims review and ERISA 
information," has two principal substantive parts. (1) "Plan administration," which includes 
claims review procedures applicable to everyone; and (2) "Your rights under ERISA," which 
includes provisions applicable only to ERISA employees. The disclaimer AEFA cited appears in 
the first of these parts, along with other information for all participants. See id:, cf. R. 1453, at 9-
10 (disputing Plaintiffs' interpretation). Nevertheless, at the very least, it warned even the most 
protected participants in the company's plans—those who could invoke the force of ERISA— 
that they had no vested right to future welfare benefits. Plaintiffs, who lacked such rights, could 
fare no better. 
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134 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 ("Vesting is determined by a review of the plan documents."); 
Knudsen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. 1990) (contractual 
"terms and conditions" govern); Sonneman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota, 
403 N.W.2d 701, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (construing contract according to its "clear[] 
and unambiguous[]" meaning). 
In any event, it is the language of FPA Section III that controls here. Plaintiffs' 
lengthy argument (PL Br. 12-14) that they remained associated with AEFA after the 
FPA's expiration is beside the point. While the FPA's benefits handbook did require 
planners to elect insurance coverage, pay their portion of the premium, and remain a 
member of an eligible class in order to receive benefits contributions, see AEFA Br. 8-9, 
24, those conditions were independent of and in addition to Section IIFs prerequisite that 
the FPA remain in effect.3 By conflating two distinct sets of conditions into one, the 
planners seek to erase Section IIFs explicit disclaimer of "any further . . . compensation." 
R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 17, at AX001977 [AD 19]. 
Thus, Plaintiffs' claim of a broken promise fails under the terms of the FPA itself. 
Plaintiffs do not identify in the FPA any unqualified promise to pay them Star Quest 
benefits in the following year. They do not address the plain language of Section III, 
3
 These conditions were the stated requirements for obtaining benefits coverage, which 
was itself a prerequisite to receiving benefits contributions. Plaintiffs miss this point again in 
claiming that their "association" with AEFA was the "trigger" making them eligible for 
contributions. PI. Br. 14. The language quoted by Plaintiffs does not say that benefits 
contributions resume upon a planner's return, but that benefits "elections" will be reinstated R 
1450, Dep. Ex. 6, at AX001236 (emphasis added). 
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which limited their compensation to what had been actually earned prior to contract 
termination. And they do not satisfy the requirements of both that provision and 
Minnesota law that the Sales Compensation Plan must specifically provide for the 
payment of compensation after contract termination. Each of these defects was alone 
sufficient to compel rejection of Plaintiffs' contract claim as a matter of law. Together, 
they resoundingly confirm the conclusion that Plaintiffs had no continued right to 
benefits. The trial court should have granted AEFA summary judgment for this reason. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' DECISION TO BECOME INDEPENDENT ADVISORS 
UNDER THE BFA EXTINGUISHED ANY CLAIM TO STAR QUEST 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Summary judgment also should have been granted to AEFA on a second theory— 
substituted contract. Plaintiffs concede on appeal that "each of the Advisors chose to 
continue their relationship with AEFA as Platform 2 Advisors." PL Br. 5 (emphasis 
added). This was a choice made with full knowledge of the BFA's effect. Plaintiffs do 
not contest that AEFA consulted extensively with the planners over the BFA's terms, that 
AEFA made changes to the contract based on the concerns of a board of planners, or that 
hundreds of planners expressed a preference for increased commissions over benefits 
payments. See AEFA Br. 10-12. Plaintiffs likewise do not quarrel with AEFA's 
showing that they received special software to calculate the financial impact of their 
Platform choice, that they were given clear notice of each Platform's compensation 
provisions, and that those notices specifically stated no further benefits contributions 
would be made "under . . . Star Quest." AEFA Br. 12-14, 34-35. Having chosen a 
course explicitly advertised as offering increased direct compensation in place of benefits 
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payments, Plaintiffs' demand for continued Star Quest contributions is inconsistent with 
the bargain they made. 
A. The BFA's Plain Terms Created a Substituted Contract That Replaced 
the FPA 
The planners agree that a substitute contract exists when "(1) the[re is] a previous 
valid contract; (2) the parties agreed to a new contract; (3) the parties formed a valid new 
contract; and (4) the parties intended to extinguish the old contract and substitute the 
new." Nat'lAm. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 173 F.3d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, 
Plaintiffs assert that the BFA is not a substituted contract because both parties must have 
a "'clear and definite'" intent to enter into a substitute agreement, and "AEFA has never 
offered any evidence that the plaintiffs actually intended to release it from the obligation 
it incurred under . . . Star Quest." PL Br. 17 (emphasis added). 
At the threshold, AEFA disagrees that Hogan requires "clear and definite" 
evidence of intent for the same parties to form a substitute contract.4 But more important, 
Hogan involved a novation, where the replacement contract also substituted a new party 
in place of one of the old ones. See 173 F.3d at 1105-06. Some courts, including Hogan, have 
required evidence of "clear and definite" intent for novations. However, no Minnesota case has 
ever adopted this elevated standard for substitute contracts. In fact, the Restatement, which 
draws a conspicuous distinction between the two doctrines, explains that a basic showing of 
intent is all that is necessary to create a substitute agreement: "If the parties intend the new 
contract to replace all of the provisions of the earlier contract, the contract is a substitute 
contract." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 279 cmt. a (1990). This difference makes sense, 
for a novation radically alters the underlying relationship by removing one party altogether, 
contrary to the baseline presumption that an obligor who assigns his duty to another party 
remains responsible to the obligee. See id. § 280 cmt. d; see also Tony & Leo, Inc. v. United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 281 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 1979). In any event, the BFA's 
unambiguous language satisfies both standards. 
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Plaintiffs are not correct that it is their subjective intent that controls whether the BFA 
created a substitute contract. Substitute contracts are interpreted no differently than any 
other written agreement. If the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, "the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of [that] 
language." Cent Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, \ 12, 40 P.3d 599. 
Whether the provisions of a subsequent contract are deemed 
to supersede the provisions of a prior contract turns on the 
parties' intent which is ascertained from the contracts 
themselves when they are unambiguous. 
Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 161 F.2d 1007, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1985); accord 
Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 252 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. 1977); Bradshaw v. Birmingham, 
671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983); In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P., 187 B.R. 856, 860 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995). Indeed, at an earlier stage of this litigation, Plaintiffs themselves 
acknowledged that the BFA must be interpreted, not based on one party's "alleged" 
purpose, but on the contract's objective "language." R. 193. 
Here, the BFA's unambiguous language establishes both parties' intent to enter 
into a substitute contract that completely reshaped their relationship and introduced a 
fundamentally different compensation structure. The BFA's Disclaimer of Benefits 
explicitly declares that its benefits package is the only remuneration to which 
Independent Advisors are entitled: 
Independent Advisor acknowledges that the Manuals, 
including the Compensation Schedule contained therein, 
constitute the complete list of the compensation and benefits 
owed Independent Advisor resulting from this Agreement or 
Independent Advisor's relationship withAEFA. 
-10-
R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000431 [AD 34] (emphasis added). The Disclaimer also states 
that every planner who chose Platform 2 agreed to relinquish any claims to payment from 
outside the BFA: 
Independent Advisor has no claim to any other compensation 
or benefit plan, program or policy of or sponsored by AEFA 
unless such plan, policy or benefit plan specifically references 
Independent Advisors in their role as Independent Advisors 
as an eligible group under such plan, program, or policy . . . . 
Id. This sweeping elimination of all prior compensation programs is unmistakable: If a 
compensation program does not "specifically" reference "Independent Advisors as an 
eligible group," then the planners have "no claim" to such compensation, even if it 
derives from a separate aspect of their "relationship with AEFA." Id. 
The planners do not contend on appeal that any provision of Star Quest ever 
specifically referred to Plaintiffs as "Independent Advisors," much less as "Independent 
Advisors in their role as Independent Advisors as an eligible group." Instead, Plaintiffs 
retreat from this dispositive fact by asserting that AEFA's obligations predating the BFA 
"survive," because a planner who signed the BFA "may currently have claims against 
AEFA which he is not disclaiming." PL Br. 18. This interpretation misapprehends the 
Disclaimer's meaning. 
The Disclaimer accomplishes two related objectives. It defines the BFA's 
compensation structure as the "complete" amount of payment due for each Independent 
Advisor's "relationship with AEFA," and it renounces the planner's right to any other 
AEFA-sponsored payment plan—"unless" the plan "specifically references Independent 
Advisors in their role as Independent Advisors." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000431 [AD 
34]. On its face, this proviso simply means that other compensation documents are 
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effective under the BFA only if they use the same language as the BFA to refer to the 
benefited group. Courts have struggled with the question of whether benefits plans for 
"employees" cover independent personnel such as franchisees, typically holding that 
independent contractors are not covered unless they are specifically referenced by the 
plan documents. The BFA follows that approach, generally excluding franchisees from 
coverage, but giving AEFA the flexibility to include Independent Advisors within a 
plan's coverage by specifically naming them. 
Thus, Plaintiffs are wrong that the "unless" clause preserved all existing benefits 
on the date the BFA was signed simply because it uses the present tense of "have." If it 
did, it would completely upend the Disclaimer itself. The "unless" clause uses the 
present tense because it applied not only on the first day of the BFA, but on every day the 
agreement is in effect. It has an ongoing role. It expressly allows AEFA to amend other 
plans to apply to "Independent Advisors" by using that specific language. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' convoluted effort to import Star Quest into the BFA by 
equating the phrase "Independent Advisor" with the term "independent contractor 
In Hensley v. Northwest Permanente P.C. Retirement Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 
1001-02 (9th Cir. 2001), for example, the court found the term "employees" to be ambiguous, 
but ultimately sustained a plan administrator's conclusion that independent contractors were not 
covered by that term. The language used in the BFA's Disclaimer avoids such potential 
ambiguity by explicitly declaring that coverage applies only if "Independent Advisors" are 
"specifically" referenced in the plan. See also Montesano v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. 
Plan, 117 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161 (D. Conn. 2000) (upholding exclusion of "leased employees"), 
affd in relevant part, 256 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2001); Admin. Comm. of Time Warner, Inc. v. 
Biscardi, No. 99 Civ. 12270 DLC, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16707, at *36-37 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 
2000) (covered workers include "regular employees," "full-time employees," and "full-time 
regular employees"). 
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advisors" carries no weight. PL Br. 24. The phrase "Independent Advisor" is a defined, 
capitalized term used throughout the BFA to refer to those planners who chose to elect 
Platform 2, "enter[] into" a franchisee relationship with AEFA, and operate an 
"Independent Financial Advisor Business." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000426 [AD 29]. 
In contrast, the term "independent contractor advisor" (PL Br. 24) is not defined by the 
BFA and appears nowhere in the agreement. Even as Plaintiffs use this term (PL Br. 20), 
it encompasses all planners who had previously qualified for Star Quest—including those 
who chose to become employees and not sign the BFA. Plaintiffs' textual gymnastics 
notwithstanding {see PL Br. 23-24), these two groups are not the same.6 
In their attempt to extend the "unless" proviso, Plaintiffs also discard their own 
reminder that courts "must not interpret a contract so as to render its provisions 
meaningless." PL Br. 20. The lengthy phrase "Independent Advisors in their role as 
Independent Advisors as an eligible group" is elaborate by design. R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, 
at P000431 [AD 34]. If it were not enough for the Disclaimer to restrict franchisees' 
6
 Plaintiffs make much of a deposition given by James Punch. PL Br. 20-24. However, 
because the Disclaimer is clear, this extrinsic evidence is irrelevant. See Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). In addition, Plaintiffs omit repeated objections to their 
questions as ambiguous and improperly calling for legal conclusions from a nonlawyer. R. 1451, 
Punch Dep., at 59. Their quotation stops immediately before Mr. Punch explains: "As I reread 
that in totality, [that is] our statement of intent on the business side to no longer offer benefit 
programs in Platform II, and that the second part of that statement is focused [on] saying that 
unless in the future a Platform II advisor is specifically identified as eligible under a plan, that 
then they would be eligible but otherwise not." Id. at 61. Mr. Punch also clarified later in the 
deposition that the term used to refer to planners before rollout was "independent contractors"— 
not "Independent Advisors." Id. at 110-11. AEFA has no need to rely on the subsequent 
corrections to the Punch deposition because, in the end, he did not say anything decisive on these 
issues. 
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available compensation by referring to them with a capitalized term, the contract goes 
one step further and adds the requirement that any plan including Independent Advisors 
must also name them "in their role as Independent Advisors as an eligible group." 
Despite the attention this phrase calls to itself, Plaintiffs attempt to equate the BFA's 
class of Independent Advisors with a far broader group that "existed prior to . . . the 
franchise agreement." PL Br. 20. Plaintiffs' failure to identify a single provision of Star 
Quest referring to them in this manner is dispositive of their claim as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs reach almost as far to give the BFA's Entire Agreement clause the 
limited meaning they place on it. That clause states: 
This Agreement, the attachments hereto, and the documents 
referred to herein constitute the entire Agreement between 
AEFA and Independent Advisor concerning the subject 
matter hereof, and supersede all prior and contemporaneous 
agreements, negotiations and representations (written and 
oral), no other representations having induced Independent 
Advisor to execute this Agreement. 
R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000458 [AD 61]. Plaintiffs contend that this clause serves only 
to preclude extrinsic evidence because its statement that it "supersedes" all prior 
agreements "modifies the phrase 'constitute the entire Agreement. . . concerning the 
subject matter hereof.'" PL Br. 24 (quoting R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000458 [AD 61]). 
Plaintiffs' interpretation does not withstand an "application of 'elementary rules of 
punctuation and grammar.'" State ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele 
County, 2002 UT 8, \ 13, 44 P.3d 680 (quoting Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. 
of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1997)). The Entire Agreement's 
"supersede" language does not modify the "constitute" passage that precedes it. Both of 
those provisions are independent clauses that attach to the sentence's subject ("This 
-14-
Agreement..."), not to each other. Consequently, the BFA must be read to "constitute 
the entire Agreement" concerning its subject matter and to "supersede all prior and 
contemporaneous agreements" between AEFA and the Independent Advisors. 
In any event, the Entire Agreement clause need not be construed to create a 
substitute contract by itself, but must be viewed in conjunction with the new agreement's 
Disclaimer of Benefits and other provisions. This integrated analysis comports not only 
with the settled rule that a contract's terms must be read together, Chergosky v. 
Crosstown Bell Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. 1990); Jones v. ERA Brokers Consoi, 
2000 UT 61, f 12, 6 P.3d 1129, but with the approach numerous other courts have taken 
in finding the intent to form substituted contracts in integration clauses. In In Re 
Worldwide Direct, for instance, an employee had entered into a severance agreement that 
included both a release of liability provision disclaiming "all charges, complaints, claims, 
[and] liabilities" and an integration clause stating that the agreement "fully supersede[d] 
any and all prior agreements or understandings between the parties hereto pertaining to 
the subject matter hereof." 268 B.R. 69, 72 (D. Del. 2001). The court held that it was the 
integration clause that "clearly and unequivocally" established the agreement as a 
substitute contract, while the release of liability provision emphasized by Plaintiffs gave 
"further" support to this interpretation. 268 B.R. 69, 72 (D. Del. 2001).7 
7
 See also, e.g., Citigifts, Inc. v. Pechnik, 492 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) 
(holding that language stating contract "supersedes any concurrent or previously signed 
documents" established substitute contract); Eagle Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 900 P.2d 475, 479 
(Or. 1995) (en banc) (finding that integration clause, "in the context of the entire written 
agreement," extinguished prior agreement). 
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Of course, even without its Disclaimer of Benefits and Entire Agreement 
provisions, the BFA would be a substitute contract because it covers the same subject 
matter for which Plaintiffs seek to invoke the FPA: compensation from AEFA after 
March 21, 2000. Plaintiffs' theory is that the FPA provided for contributions in the year 
following its termination. This reading clashes with the BFA, which also determines 
compensation in that year and is therefore a substituted contract. 
Plaintiffs attempt (PL Br. 26) to avoid that conclusion by relying on two cases, 
Security Watch and Kentucky Fried Chicken. But those cases involved "annual 
contracts" and "completed transactions" that had been fully discharged by the time their 
successor agreements became operative. Sec. Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Sys., 176 F.3d 369, 
372 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he term of the agreement is twelve months."); Kentucky Fried 
Chicken Corp. v. Collect ramatic, 547 A.2d 245, 248 (N.H. 1988) (restaurant equipment 
in question had been "bought and sold" more than a year-and-a-half before the second 
contract was formed). Here, Plaintiffs' argument depends on their assumption that the 
o 
FPA somehow carried over into the very period in which the BFA governs. 
In the end, Plaintiffs' construction of the BFA cannot be reconciled with the 
agreement's written, objective terms. The only reasonable interpretation of the BFA as a 
8
 The other cases on which Plaintiffs rely (PL Br. 18-19) to rebut the BFA's effect as a 
substituted contract involve very different facts. In one, the parties conceded that there had not 
been a novation, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Teem P'ship, 835 F. Supp. 563, 569 (D. Colo. 1993). 
In the other, the new contract "specifically and unambiguously" provided that it did not 
extinguish existing obligations. Lampley v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 609, 617 (N.D. Miss. 
1998). Plaintiffs do not point to any language in the BFA "specifically and unambiguously" 
preserving obligations that existed prior to its effective date. 
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whole is that it "supersede[s] all prior" agreements between the parties by creating a new 
relationship in which "Independent Advisors" relinquish claim to "any other 
compensation," and accept the BFA's compensation as the "complete" amount due for 
their entire "relationship with AEFA." R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 28, at P000426, P000431, 
P000458 [AD 29, 34, 61]. The trial court erred when it disregarded the BFA's plain 
terms and ruled that the agreement "is not a substituted contract." R. 906 [AD 6]. The 
court's failure to enter judgment in favor of AEFA on this independent ground must be 
corrected on appeal. 
B. Evidence of a Substituted Contract Precluded a Grant of Summary 
Judgment for Plaintiffs 
Even if the BFA did not unambiguously create a substituted contract, the court 
erred by granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on this issue. Summary judgment for 
Plaintiffs was inappropriate because the BFA's terms in no way sustained their reading of 
the contract, and because extensive parol evidence supported AEFA's interpretation that 
it was a substitute agreement. AEFA's contrary, reasonable interpretation of the BFA 
created a factual dispute that should have prevented summary judgment in favor of the 
planners. SME, 2001 UT 54 at <J[ 9. 
Plaintiffs contend that AEFA waived this argument because AEFA "never raised" 
any "factual disputes" before the trial court concerning the BFA's meaning. PL Br. 28. 
This is false. AEFA preserved numerous factual issues of the parties' intent in forming 
the BFA, including whether the BFA's terms created a substituted contract. In the 
proceedings below, AEFA moved for summary judgment and opposed Plaintiffs' 
summary judgment motion. AEFA's combined pleading specifically made the argument 
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that the BFA "constitutes a substituted contract, extinguishing . . . Star Quest." R. 341. 
AEFA supported this argument with an analysis of the BFA's terms, R. 337-40, 
applicable caselaw, R. 337-44, and relevant, numbered facts.9 AEFA argued that 
Plaintiffs had signed the BFA knowing AEFA 'Viewed the BFA as a replacement" for the 
FPA, and that Plaintiffs understood AEFA planned to apply Star Quest funds to the 
higher, 85% commission payouts. R. 343, 344 & n.17; see also R. 1453, at 5-6, 36-47. 
Finally, AEFA specifically disputed Plaintiffs' claim that planners were called 
"Independent Advisors" prior to the BFA's effective date. R. 299. Thus, if the court had 
any doubt about whether the BFA's terms created a substitute agreement, it was plainly 
on notice that a jury trial would be necessary to determine the parties' intent. 
Utah procedure requires that if a court finds a contract ambiguous based on 
conflicting, reasonable interpretations of its terms, the ambiguity must be resolved "by 
determining the parties' intent from parol evidence." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of 
State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). In SME Industries, Inc. v. 
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Associates, for instance, each party had sought 
summary judgment based on differing contractual readings. 2001 UT 54, fjl 12-13, 28 
P.3d 669. On appeal, this Court found both parties' textual interpretations "tenable," and 
9
 For example, one portion of AEFA's facts section, entitled "Facts Regarding 
Substituted Contract," explained that "[s]ome Advisors subjectively understood that the BFA 
replaced the FPA." R. 315. AEFA also quoted the statement in the Platform Resource Kit notice 
that Independent Advisors would "pay the full cost" of insurance after rollout, as well as a 
September 1999 reminder that planners who chose Platform 2 would not receive "a Company 
contribution" toward benefits. R. 309. 
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thus, remanded the case for a determination of the contract's meaning from parol 
evidence. Id. \ 15. Similarly, in Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., this Court held that 
consideration of extrinsic evidence was necessary to determine the meaning of the term 
"sale" in the employment agreement at issue, even though both parties argued for 
conflicting interpretations of that term from the contract's "unambiguous[]" and "plain" 
language. 1999 UT 89, <H 10, 18, 22, 987 P.2d 48.10 
In this case, AEFA's interpretation of the BFA as a substitute agreement that 
entirely replaced the FPA was not only "tenable, reasonable, and supportable" by the 
contract's terms, it was confirmed by the evidence that AEFA submitted on summary 
judgment. WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 27, 54 P.3d 1139. 
As AEFA's initial brief demonstrated (AEFA Br. 34-36), Plaintiffs received repeated 
notices that they would not collect any additional Star Quest payments if they decided to 
become Independent Advisors under the BFA. One bulletin, distributed nearly six 
months before rollout, could not have been more clear: 
Platform 1 advisors will receive company contributions to 
health and welfare benefits as part of the Platform 1 design. 
In Platform 2, funding previously allocated for Star Quest 
benefit awards has been incorporated into the 85% [BFA 
commissions] payout rate. Therefore, there will be no 
additional reimbursements to advisors for benefits that would 
have been earned under the Star Quest program. 
lu
 Accord St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., 490 N.W.2d 626, 630 
(Minn. 1992) ("If issues of fact exist, the fact that the parties have brought cross motions for 
summary judgment will not obviate the need for trial...."); Donnay v. Boulware, 144 N.W.2d 
711,716 (Minn. 1966) (remanding for consideration of parol evidence after parties offered 
conflicting, reasonable interpretations of the contracts plain language). 
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R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 21, at AX001769 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., R. 1450, Dep. Ex. 
11, at AX001158 & n.* [AD 84] (no company benefits contribution in Platform 2); 
AEFA Br. 34-36. This evidence objectively manifests the parties' intent to form a 
substitute contract in which the BFA's compensation package would replace benefits 
payments under Star Quest. 
Indeed, even under the subjective intent test that Plaintiffs espouse, summary 
judgment for Plaintiffs was precluded. Two of the named Plaintiffs actually admitted that 
the BFA extinguished the FPA. As Plaintiff John Ford granted: "Q. You understood 
your prior contracts were being terminated and [the BFA] was being substituted, correct? 
A. Correct." R. 1451, John Ford Dep., at 192; see also R. 1451, Aamodt Dep., at 136. 
In these circumstances, the trial court could not hold as a matter of law that the parties 
had not intended to enter into a substitute agreement. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge the explicitness, clarity, or comprehensiveness of 
AEFA's notices that planners who became Independent Advisors would not receive 
additional Star Quest payments.11 Hence, whatever Plaintiffs now claim their subjective 
motive was, the circumstances surrounding the BFA's formation make obvious their 
Without any analysis or explanation, Plaintiffs quote a March 1999 e-mail sent by 
Craig Wallenta. PL Br. 5-6. This email was written by a nonlawyer early in the rollout process, 
before AEFA modified the draft BFA in response to the Advanced Advisory Board's concerns. 
Plaintiffs do not include the response, which stated: "We have no legal obligation to give 
[planners] a Company contribution for something that they will no longer be eligible for. [I]f 
they are in Platform II, Benefit eligibility goes away the minute they choose Platform II." R. 
1452, Ex. I, at AX005070. In any event, this internal exchange was never communicated to the 
planners and thus cannot establish the parties' intent. 
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objective intent: By signing the BFA, Plaintiffs were accepting a more profitable 
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regarding notice are undisputed, this evidence—along with the BFA's explicit 
language—could have formed t! le basis foi gi ai itii lg sum i i lai ) r ji ldgi i lei it to AEF'/ \ l Bi it 
at the * "eiry least, this evidence should have prevented the trial court from awarding 
summary judgment to Plaintiffs. In the event of any ambiguity, the court was required to 
1
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WebBanK 2002 UT 88 at f 28; * V/?/. / •'„ *n v., 2002 UT \ at % 12; Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at 
(]{ 22; accord Trondson \>. Janikula r > \ v\ ,. :. ). 
Ill 4EFA WAS
 E N T I T L E D
 T O INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE 
FINANCIAL BENEFITS PT \T\TTFFS OBTAINED UNDER THE BFA 
» \ M in introducing any evidence of 
offsetting benefits in the trial on damages. AEFA was prepared to demonstrate to the 
jury that funding previous!) allot alal In M.ti Uursl h.nl 'M-CII used l\v MMM1 ll1*'1 
commission rate for Independent Advisors from 83% to 85%, and that this had resulted in 
offsetting benefits to the class of $9,282,226, 71 See AEF \ Bi 38 39, 
1  * I j 11111 ffs f 11 s I ; i s s r r I 111.11 11 I i s ( <»11 n I i nnsl r c v i c w the trial court's decision to 
exclude offsetting benefits evidence "for abuse of discretion," PI Br 1 While Plaintiffs 
12
 Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge, "[AEFA] could have made this restructure contingent 
upon the agreement of the Advisors to expressly waive their Star Quest benefits." PL Br 34 
What Plaintiffs fail to recognize, however, is that the sweeping disclaimers of the BFA, 
combined with the explicit notices that Star Quest benefits would not be paid, achieved precisely 
this result. 
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correctly note that a trial court's decision to exclude particular factual evidence demands 
deference, e.g., Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 
1990), the trial court here disallowed evidence of offsetting benefits across the board. It 
made a legal determination that offsets apply "only" if the planners were saved from "the 
cost of performance on the breached contract." R. 1056 [AD 8]. The issue of "how the 
law of damages should treat" a plaintiffs claim is a legal conclusion to which this Court 
accords "no particular deference but review[s] for correctness." Anesthesiologists 
Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1237-38 (Utah 1994).13 
The trial court's legal conclusion was incorrect. Although the offset principle 
allows for reduced damages where the plaintiff is relieved from performance, nothing in 
the doctrine restricts its application to that lone situation. The rule is that where a 
defendant's breach causes harm "but also operates directly to confer some benefit upon 
the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's claim for damages may be diminished by the amount of the 
benefit." Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Remedies—Damages, Equity and 
Restitution § 3.6, at 181 (1973). The offset rule therefore applies whenever "the benefits 
accruing to the plaintiff are sufficiently proximate to the contract to warrant reducing the 
plaintiff's damages and the failure to do so would permit the plaintiff to obtain 
13
 See also, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, f 23, 7 P.3d 783 (measure of damages 
legal question where there is a general utrule[] or principle[]'" that governs (quoting State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)); Corbett v. Seamons, 904 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (applying correctness standard of review trial court's admission of evidence on lost 
earning capacity). See generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993) 
(admissibility decisions are "sum of several rulings, each of which may be reviewed under a 
separate standard"). 
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unreasonable damages." Louisiana Sulphur Carriers Inc i > Gulf Res, & Chem, Corp 
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715, 720 (3d Cii 19 71). Similarly, in Macon-Bibb County Water & Sewerage Authority 
v. Tuttle/White Constructors, Inc » the court in part allowed an offset because "the means 
absent the breach. 530 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (M.D. Ga. 1981); see also King Grain Co, v. 
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Plaintiffs d< ? provide a single case, or any other legal authority, that limits the 
offset doctrine "only' to cases where the breach relieves the complainant of performance. 
the BFA. AEFA has pointed out—without contradiction that the nine named Plaintiffs 
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earned an average of $52,985 more in 2000 as a result of their transition from Star Quest 
to the BFA, despite the fact that their aggregate sales production did not rise at all. 
AEFA Br. 16, 42. AEFA's estimate of $9 million in offsetting benefits to the plaintiff 
class is also not contested on appeal. Thus, despite the assertions in their brief that 
"Advisors were in no way benefited by AEFA's breach of contract," PL Br. 9, there is 
persuasive evidence in the record that these planners were substantially benefited. 
By depriving the jury of the chance to consider this and similar evidence, the trial 
court erred. The trial court got this issue right the first time, when in denying summary 
judgment it found that there were unresolved factual issues. R. 862 [AD 01]. Even 
assuming a breach of the FPA, AEFA was entitled to submit to a jury the question of 
whether any damages from this breach should have been reduced by the benefits 
Plaintiffs received as a result of Star Quest's termination. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment in this case is not sound. Neither the language of the contracts nor 
the surrounding circumstances received an adequate examination. Pertinent evidence on 
damages was excluded. Magnified by a nationwide class action, these errors resulted in a 
$14 million verdict that is contrary to law. This Court should reverse and order entr\ < f 
judgment for the Defendant based on the plain language of the contracts. Alternatn ci\. .1 
should order a trial at vs lni.li tin- Minoiindiiig i iivumslnmvs iml ,iny benefits lo tIn* 
l'l.iiiitil'K can be considered by a jury. 
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Section 9- Claims review and ERISA information 
(Ste also Section I of this Handbook) 
Introduction 
Administrative details about your benefit plans are included in this soct.on of 
your benefits handbook General descnpt.ons of each plan are ,„ other sect,on< 
of this Handbook Except for the claims review procedure, .his section aui„,e< 
onh to first vear financial advisors, district managers within the Sure of 
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Section 9: Claims review and ERISA information 
(See also Section l of this Hand&ook} 
Plan sponsor 
Except for the Business Travel Accident, Plan,, the sponsor of these plans is 
American Express Financial Corporation, The sponsor's address is. 
American Express Financial Corporation 
IDS Tower 10 
Minneapolis, MN 554 10 
The employer identification number (EIN) assigned to American Express 
Financial Corporation for benefit reporting purposes is: 
13-3180631 
r- • 
American Express Company 
World Financial Center 
Now York. NY 102S5-47SO 
The employer identification number (EIN) assigned to American Express 
Company for benefit, reporting purposes is: 
13-4922230 
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Section 9 Claims review and ERISA information 
(Set also Section 1 of this Handbook) 
Plan facts 
The following chart shows the names and administrative numbers of the benefit 
plans described in this Handbook The chart also lists the tvpe of plan tvpe of 
administration and current insurance carrier 
Official plan name 
American Express 
financial Corporation 







Shon Term Disability 
Plan for members of 




ptan for members of 



















Type of plan 
Welfare benefit olan 
providing medical 
oenefus through a 
md)Or medical plan 
health maintenance 
organizations and 
point o* service 
plans 
Welfare benefit plan 
providing dental 
coverage through 
dosed panei and 
point of service 
plans 
Welfare benefit plan 
providing shon term 
disability income 
benefits 
v\si'ar5 oene' o«an 
proving ong term 




By American Express 
Financial Corporation for 
the Traditional Medical 
Option and Choice Plus 
with processing and 
payment of claims by 
Aetna/US Heaimcare for 
the Traditional Medical 














Self funded — 
Traditional Medical 
Option Choice Plus 
Names and addresses o* 
HMOs are available upon 
reouest by calling HfiiCS 
at 80C 483 3944 
Delta Demai 
7807 Creekrifloe Circle 
P0 Box 330 
Minneapolis MN 55440 
Aetna/ US Healthcare 
151 Farmmgion Avenue 
Hartford CT 05156 3007 
Metropolitan life 
Insurance Company 









Section 9: Claims review and ERISA information 
(See also Se< non 1 of rhi> Handbrnk) 
Plan faCtS continued 
Official plan name 
American Express 
financial Corpora;»on 
Group Ufe Insurance 




Accidental Death and 
Dismemberment 
insurance Plan for 







Vision Caa Plan 
American Express 
financial Corporation 






















lypc j l plan 
Welfare benefit plan 
providing group ii»e 
insurance benefits 










Welfare benefit plan 
providing vision care 
benefits 














Metropolitan u fe 
insurance Company 





P0 Box 1057 
GtaStonoury CT 
06C33-5057 




4900 Seminary Road #300 
Alexandria VA 22311 
v sion Service Plan 
One Gatehall Or 
Parsippany NJ 07054 
Hyatt legal Services 
1215 Superior Avenue 
Cleveland OH 
44114 3292 
Signatu'e legal Services 
200 Noah Martingale Rd 
Schaumburg.il 60173 
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Section 9: Claims review and ERISA information 
(See also Section 1 of this Handbook) 
Plan faCtS continue 
Additional providers: The following companies also provide administrative sen ices to various plans 
Express Pharmacv 
620 Epsilon Drive 
Pittsburgh PA 1523S 
Provides mail-order prescription drug services to persons covered umier the 
Traditional Medical Option 
ValueOptions 
433 River Street 
Troy N\ 12180 
Provides network and administrative services for mental health/chemical 
dependency treatment for persons covered under the Traditional Medical 
Option 
Express ScnpisAalue R\ 
PO Box 41366 
Plymouth. MS 55441-0366 
Pro\ ides prescription drug sen ices for persons covered under the Traditional 
Medical Option 
• 
Plans Not Insured — Information on Aetna Life Insurance Company and 
HealthParoiers/GHI Administration inc. (Traditional Medical Plan and 
Choice Plus Options) 
Neither Aetna Life Insurance Company not HealthPartners/GHI Administration 
Inc guarantees or insures benefits under the Traditional or Choice Plus medical 
options Aetna and HealthPartners provide plan administration for these options 
including such sen ices as claims payment utilization review caso management 
quality assurance and grievance and appeals procedures among others 
Address of Claims Administrators — Aetna Life Insurance Companv PO Box 
2907 • Loop Station Minneapolis MN 55402. HealthPartnprs<'GHl Administration 




Section 9: Claims review and ERISA information 
(See also Section 1 of this Handbook) 
Plan administration 
Who i$ the pian administrator7 The plan administrator for all of the welfare benefit plans listed on pages 9-4 
and 9-5 of this Handbook is: 
For' first-year financial advisors, district managers m New" York, field \ ice 
presidents and group vice presidents: 
Employee Benefits Administration Committee 
c/o Vice President, Retirement Plans 
IDS Tower 10 —FBI 1/360 
Minneapolis, MN 55440-0010 
(612)671 1924 
I HI i l l Ini"i Iniit.II I.II .inI'll iMiifii win epHiiJenn contractors: 
Vice President, U.S. Benefits 
American Express Company 
World Financial Center 
200 Vesey Street 
New York, NY 10285 
(212)640-2000 
HR1CS. which administers the welfare plans on a day-to-day basis,, • :an I >e 
reached at 
Human Resources Information and Client Services 
American Express Financial Corporation 
IDS Tower 10— FBI 1/115 
Minneapolis. MN 55440-0010 
(612)671-3051 
(800)483-3944 
The Plan Administrator has the sole discretion and authority to-
• Make and enforce rules and regulations for the efficient administration of the 
plans and the transaction of business pertaining to the plans. 
• Interpret the plans and decide any and all matters arising thereunder 
including factual issues relating to any benefit claims, 
• Remedy possible ambiguities, inconsistencies, or omiss 
the plans; 
•Determine eligibility to participate in and receive benefits under the plans. 
•Authorize payment of benefits; 
•Appoint a claims review commn »r 
the plans. 
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Plan administration 
All interpretations, determinations, and decisions of the Plan Administrator or the 
Plan Administrator's designee, including decisions concerning disputed facts end 
or possible ambiguities inconsistencies, and omissions d^ e final c o n c u r P anil 
binding upon the plan sponsor, participants, beneficiaries and all other pers< n> 
having any interest under the plans to the full extent permitted b\ ERISA 
Who is the agent fonne service The Vice President of Field Compensation and Administration is also the agent 
of legal process7 for the service of legal process related to the welfare benefit plans, excluding the 
Business Travel Accident Plan, and may be contacted as the agent for sen ice of 
legal process at the address above The General Counsel of the American 
Express Company is the agent for the semce of legal process for the Business 
Travel Accident Plan 
How is a plan year defined7 The financial records for all plans described in this Handbook are kept on the 
basis of a calendar year beginning on Jan 1 and ending on Dec 31 
What is the claims review Claims revieiv procedure 
procedure i'my ciaim is oenied7 The plan administrator makes all determinations that relate to the right of an\ 
person to a benefit under the plan, unless the plan administrator has delegated 
that responsibility to an insurer or provider If you believe you are eligible for 
benefits under a plan, \ou may file a claim for benefits All claims for benefits 
under a plan must be submitted in writing following the procedures provided in 
the plan 
Clotm denial and appeal procedure. 
Ordinanh, within 90 days after receiving a written claim for benefits, the plan 
administrator, the provider or the insurer will notify the claimant in writing if 
the claim has been denied This written notice of denial will include the specific 
reasons for the denial, specific references to the plan provisions on which the 
denial is based a description of any additional material or information that is 
needed to perfect or process the claim and an explanation of whv it is necessan 
and an explanation of the claimant s right to appeal the decision to denv the claim 
If because of special circumstances, an extension of time is required the plan 
administrator, the provider or the insurer may take another 90 days to process 
the claim Written notice of the extension will oe giver, to the claimant before 
the end of the 90 dav period This notice will indicate the special circumstances 
requiring the extension of time and the date bv which a decision is expected 
to be made 
If the claimant is not notified m writing wuhin 90 days (or within 180 davs in 
special circumstances) that the claim has been denied the c laim is considered 
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Plan administration com*** 
\ claimant (or his or her duly authorized representative) who wants to appeal 
the plan administrator's, provider's or insurer's decision to den\ a claim must 
submit a written request for review to the plan administrator prouder or 
insurer within 60 davs after receipt of the notice of denial Theciaimam * *ur 
duly authorized representative's) request for review must include specific 
reasons why the claimant believes the claim should be approved In preparing a 
request for review and in presenting the case to the plan administrator prouder 
or insurer the claimant (or his or her duly authorized representative) shall be 
entitled to review pertinent plan documents that relate to the claim made 
Ordinarily, within 60 days after receiving a request for review, the plan 
administrator, provider or insurer will review the claim and its decision to denv 
and will gne written notice of its final decision to the claimant However if 
special circumstances require additional time, an extension of up to 60 davs will 
be allowed for making this decision. If such an extension of time is required, 
written notice of the extension will be given to the claimant before the end of 
the initial 60-day period The notice of final decision will include specific 
reasons for the decision and references to the plan provision on which the 
decision is based If the plan administrators, providers or insurer s final 
decision is not provided within the 60-day period (or 120 davs period in special 
circumstances), the claim is deemed to be denied on review 
First-year financial advisors, district managers in New ^ork, field vice presidents 
and group vice presidents have additional rights if a claim is denied The 
following page details those rights 
What are my rights to American Express and American Express Financial Corporation make no 
these plans7 promise to continue these benefits in the future and have the right to amend or 
terminate any coverage for active plan participants or retired covered 
individuals at any time Rights to future benefits will never vest Retirement 
do«*s not give any retiree any vested rights to continue plan benefits 
Information Applicable to this Handbook 
This Handbook describes only certain highlights of some of American Express 
Company s employee benefits plans It does not supersede the actual provisions 
of th* applicable plan documents, which in all cases are the final authority The 
Plan Administrator has the sole discretion and authority' to determine eligibihn* 
for hon^fits and to interpret ambiguous provisions of the respective plans 
If you have questions about your benefits after reading this material, please 
\X00l386 contact HR1CS East at (800) 483-3944 
The plans described here may be amended (or even terminated) b\ the 
Companv at an\ time without prior notice to or consent by employees 
Section 9 Claims review and ERISA information 
(See also Section 1 of this Handbook) 
Plan administration 
This Handbook does not create a contract of emplovment benveen the Com pan, 
and anv emplovee 
Future of the Plans 
Because of the need for confidentiality decisions regarding changes to the 
Compam s benefits plans programs, practices or policies are generalK not 
discussed or e\aluated below the highest le\els of management Mandgers and 
their representames below these levels do not know whether the Compam will 
or will not change or adopt any particular benefit plan Nor are the\ in 3 position 
to advise am emplovee on, or speculate about, future plans Participants should 
make no assumptions about future changes or the impact changes mas ha\e on 
their personal situation until a change is formalh announced b\ the Compam 
The plans described here may be amended or terminated b\ the Compam 
through its Board of Directors, at any time without prior notice to or consent ov 
employees The Company s Board of Directors mav delegate amendment 
authontv to the Company's Chief Executive Officer President or am Executive 
Vice President, as the Board, in its sole discretion deems appropriate These 
SPDs do not create a contract of emplovment between the Compam and its 
subsidiaries and am emplovee 
\our benefits at or after retirement, if any, may be different from those described 
here due to changes made to the plans or the termination of am of the plans 
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Your rights under ERISA 
What rights and protection am As a participant in the plans described in this Handbook, first->ear financial 
/ entitled to under ERISA ? advisors, district managers in New York state, field vice presidents and group 
vice presidents are entitled to certain rights and protections under the 
Emplovee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. as amended (ERISA) 
ERISA provides that all plan participants shall be entitled to. 
— Examine, without charge, at the plan administrators office, all plan 
documents, tncludmg insurance contracts and copies of all documents filed 
by the plans with the US Department of Labor, such as annual reports and 
plan descriptions 
— Obtain copies of all plan documents (if different from this Handbook) and 
other plan information upon written request to the plan administrator The 
administrator may make a reasonable charge for the copies 
— Receive a summary of the plans annual financial reports The plan 
administrator is required by law to furnish each participant with copies of . 
these summary annual reports 
in addition to creating rights for plan participants. ERISA imposes duties upor 
the people who are responsible for the operation of the benefit plans 
The people who operate your plans, called 'fiduciaries' of the plans, have a duty 
to do so prudently and in the interest of you and other plan participants and 
beneficiaries. No one, including your employer or any other person, may fire \ou 
or otherwise discriminate against you in anyway to prevent you from obtaining 
a welfare benefit or exercising your rights under ERISA. If your claim for a 
welfare benefit is denied in whole or in part, you must receive a written 
explanation of the reason for denial. You have the right to have the plan review 
and reconsider your claim 
I'nder ERISA, there are steps you can take to enforce the above rights For 
instance, if you request materials from the plan and do not receive them within 
30 days, you may file a suit in a federal court In such as case, the court max 
require the plan administrator to provide the materials and pay you up to SlOO a 
dav until vou receive the materials unless the materials were not sent due to 
reasons bevond the control of the administrator 
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What additional nghis do I have If you have a claim for benefits that is denied or ignored in whole or in part, \ou 
under ERISA? may file suit in a state or federal court. If it should happen that the plan 
fiduciaries misuse the plan's money, or if you are discriminated against for 
asserting your rights, you may seek assistance from the IS Department of Labor 
or you may file suit in a federal court The court will decide who should pay 
court costs and legal fees If you are successful, the court may order the person 
you have sued to pay these costs and fees. If you lose, the court may order you to 
pay these costs and fees, for example, if it finds your claim is frivolous If you 
have any questions about your plan, you should contact the plan administrator 
If you have any questions about your rights under ERISA, vou should contact the 
nearest office of the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (P\\ BA) U S 
Department of Labor, listed in your telephone director* or the Division of 
Technical Assistance and Inquiries, PWBA, U S Department of Labor 200 
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC, 20210, phone (202) 219-4377 
Information Applicable to First-Year Financial Advisors, District Managers 
in New York State, Field Vice Presidents and Group Vice Presidents 
This information in this Benefits Handbook forms the Summary Plan 
Descriptions (SPDs) for the benefit plans described Each SPD consists of the 
plan s separate section in the Handbook, plus applicable portions of Section 1 
and Section 8, as cited in every chapter 
These SPDs contain only certain highlights of the plans They do not supersede 
the actual plan documents, which in all cases are the final authont> Due to the 
exer-increasing complexity or employee benefit plans, plan participants should 
rely only on the wntten SPDs or formal plan documents The Plan Administrator 
retains exclusive authority and discretion to interpret the terms of the benefit 
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